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Like other historical milestones,
the second anniversary of the
September 11, 2001 terrorist attack in
the United States provides a good
opportunity for critical evaluation. It
invites an interim assessment of the
successes and failures of the offensive
launched by the US-led international
coalition against terrorism and
terrorist organizations, first and
foremost al-Qaeda and its affiliates.
Examining the unique characteristics
of Bin Laden’s terrorist network and
the manner in which it wages its
battle may clarify the apparent
disparity between the military defeat
inflicted by the United States on the
Taliban’s Islamic regime and on al-
Qaeda in Afghanistan, and the
common feeling both inside and
outside the US that al-Qaeda and its
brand of international terrorism is far
from defeated.
The two years that have passed
since the September 11 attack were
perhaps the stormiest years in the
history of international terrorism.
Although the period was not
exceptional in terms of the number of
attacks carried out, it was charac-
terized by a rise in the number and
frequency of showcase attacks, some
of which resulted in dozens and even
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hundreds of casualties. If other large-
scale attacks planned by terrorist
groups had not been thwarted, the
number of casualties would un-
doubtedly have been much higher.
Al-Qaeda and organizations
affiliated with it are clearly the
primary party responsible for the
wave and intensity of international
terrorism over the past two years.
Moreover, in addition to “conven-
tional” terrorist attacks, the terrorist
networks linked to al-Qaeda, under
the leadership of the “Afghan
alumni,” have started to demonstrate
an inclination towards using non-
conventional warfare materials. The
arrest in Europe of a number of
terrorist cells plotting to use toxins
such as ricin and cyanide1 was an
indication of this tendency, which, it
can be assumed, may spread to other
terrorist organizations and possibly
expand to include the use of non-
conventional warfare materials with
even greater harmful potential.2
Al-Qaeda’s Operating
Channels
Before assessing the battle against al-
Qaeda and al-Qaeda’s ability to
withstand the coalition offensive, it is
important to describe al-Qaeda and its
channels of operation. Indeed, it is its
flexible and multi-faceted structure
that endows the organization with an
impressive ability to survive and
continue to cause damage effectively
through a variety of operative venues.
Al-Qaeda has evolved con-
siderably since it was founded by Bin
Laden in Afghanistan in the late 1980s.
The group that started out as an
organizational headquarters of sorts
for selecting and directing volunteers
who came to Afghanistan to fight
alongside the local Mujahidin was
transformed over the years into a full-
fledged terrorist organization in its
own right. The operative leadership
of the transformed al-Qaeda is made
up of “Afghan alumni,” including
veterans of the war against the Soviet
Union and promising newer recruits,
trained in Sudan and Afghanistan
from the early 1990s onward, who
chose to remain with Bin Laden and
serve under his command. Since June
2001, al-Qaeda has also been part of a
partnership called al-Qaidat al-Jihad,
which is the formalized union of a
preexisting alliance between al-Qaeda
and the Egyptian Islamic Jihad, led by
Dr. Ayman Zawahiri.
Bin Laden and al-Qaeda operate
through additional channels as well.22
Al-Qaeda is the central and dominant
organization in the international
Islamic umbrella organization
established in 1998 known as the
“Islamic Front for Jihad against the
Jews and the Crusaders.” The Islamic
Front consolidates partnerships
among independent terrorist
networks and organizations linked by
the common ideological aim of
imposing theocratic regimes on
Muslim countries throughout the
world. Some act as ad hoc terrorist
networks and coordinate their
activities with al-Qaeda in varying
degrees. Others are independent
organizations that carry out attacks on
their own, without specific
instructions from al-Qaeda, yet are
ideologically identified with it.
Indeed, all the organizations work
“according to the orders of God and
in his path” (“fi sabil Allah”) in order
to have the laws of the shari’a (Islamic
religious law) binding in their home
countries.
These parallel and at times
intertwining channels endow al-
Qaeda not only with immense
operative capability, but with
flexibility and the capability to adapt
modes of activity to changing circum-
stances and variable environments.
Al-Qaeda vs. the West
The nature of the battle of the United
States and its allies against al-Qaeda
and its affiliates is that of a zero-sum
game. This stems primarily from the
worldview and extremist methods of
Bin Laden and his associates, which
leave no room for political negotiation
or any type of compromise. The West
vs. al-Qaeda is a fight far different
from the battle, relentless in its own
right, between the coalition against
terrorism and the states that sponsor
terrorism and their protégés. That
offensive aims to bring about a change
in the behavior of “rogue states” and
groups under their protection, and
force them to stop or at the very least
significantly moderate their use of
terrorism to promote political
interests. As a result, the means
employed are primarily in the
political, diplomatic, and economic
arenas, with recourse to the military
arena in extreme cases only.
The struggle against al-Qaeda and
its affiliates is fundamentally
asymmetrical in terms of the power
and the capabilities of the adversaries.
The United States and its allies boast
a major advantage in power,
resources, and the means they can
mobilize in order to win the battle.
However, Bin Laden and those he
supports stand before them armed
with extremist ideology, “maximizing
the strength of their weakness” with
skill and practical terrorist experience.
They make deft use of the advantages
at their disposal, maneuvering with
impressive coordination and periodi-
cally succeeding in striking at their
adversaries’ weak points. The no-
holds-barred rules by which they are
governed are adapted to suit their
capabilities and beliefs, and involve
exploiting the freedoms of the liberal
societies they penetrate and within
which they operate.
In contrast, the West has not
consistently made use of its relative
strength, either because it ignores the
clearly stated aim of al-Qaeda and its
affiliates to use violence to change its
way of life, or because it fails to
appreciate the urgency of the threat
that confronts it. Financial constraints
or differing sets of priorities often
circumscribe inter-state cooperation.
In addition, the power and influence
of public opinion in many Western
countries further compounds the
already existing difficulties in trying
to develop a unified Western policy
against terrorism that is effective,
consistent, coordinated, and binding.
The inherent nature of democratic
systems that sustain and even foster
opposing ideas constitutes a major
obstacle to the ability to coordinate a
uniform policy, be it on an intra or
inter-state level.
There is also a fundamental
difference between the two parties’
concept of the terms “defeat” and
“victory” in the battle between them.
For instance, voices can be heard in
the United States today arguing that
al-Qaeda is losing its power and
approaching defeat.3 However, other
refrains emanate from Bin Laden and
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his associates, claiming that the
organization’s present situation,
which appears as defeat, is in fact
nothing more than a temporary and
necessary lull during the current
battle, on the way to certain victory
in the war as a whole.4 More than a
war of public relations, these
contrasting projections represent a
fundamental divide in perception
over progress of the offensive. In this
context, it is also important to note
that even the concepts of time and
space are understood differently by
Bin Laden and his affiliates from his
adversaries in the West. Against the
Western desire for quick results and a
battle defined by territorial borders,
al-Qaeda ideology understands its
struggle as a long-term effort that
transcends ready spatial and temporal
contours.5
The al-Qaeda Scorecard
The offensive launched by the US-led
international coalition against
terrorism that began in October 2001
and has continued in various forms
has not succeeded in destroying al-
Qaeda and its operational potential.
However, without a doubt it has
leveled a series of painful blows that
resulted in the loss of al-Qaeda’s main
patron - the Taliban, removed from
power in Afghanistan - and the loss
of its “home turf,” from which al-
Qaeda had operated unhindered since
1996. The organization suffered severe
upsets to its physical infrastructure,
including the loss of training camps,
equipment, and other resources.
Many of the organization’s docu-
ments were captured, providing a
great deal of information about al-
Qaeda’s operating methods. Some of
this material even resulted in the
thwarting of attacks throughout the
world that were already planned.
Al-Qaeda lost a considerable
portion of its cadres and fighters, who
were killed or captured in Afghani-
stan. In addition, over the past two
years, many senior operatives
involved in activating terrorist
networks have been arrested around
the world, with the organization’s
leadership now the top priority of
intelligence services of different
countries. Examples of successful
pursuits include the killing of al-
Qaeda’s military commander Abu
Hafez al-Masri in Afghanistan and the
arrests of Khaled Sheikh Mohammad
(the al-Qaeda commander of the
September 11 attacks), Abdul Rahman
al-Nashiri and Walid (“Khaled”) Bin
Atash (commanders of the attack on
the destroyer U.S.S. Cole), Abu
Zubeida (the primary liaison officer
between al-Qaeda and terrorist
networks in the United States, Europe,
and the Middle East), and the heads
of terrorist networks in Africa and
Asia, such as recently-captured
“Hambali.”6 At the same time, the
financial system of al-Qaeda and its
affiliates was placed under inter-
national restrictions, as were its efforts
to purchase and produce non-
conventional warfare materials.
In addition, al-Qaeda sustained a
blow to its prestige as the “defeater
of empires” due to its own heavy
losses and those of the Taliban in the
extremely short American campaign
in Afghanistan, especially given its
bombastic prediction that the United
States would find itself all too soon
mired in another Vietnam, along the
lines of the Soviet experience in
Afghanistan. However, its unique
structure, its partnership with Islamic
terrorist organizations and networks
around the world, and its view of the
struggle as vital, extended, and
religiously sanctioned, especially after
the events of September and October
2001, enabled al-Qaeda to take
advantage of its small, flexible, and
dispersed nature and regroup itself
for the confrontation ahead. The
struggle is led by its senior officials
under the tutelage of Bin Laden and
his deputy Zawahiri, who remain
alive, free, and threatening, and who
continue to direct the organization
and symbolically represent the
organization’s endurance, if not its so-
called invincibility. Its members have
found shelter in scattered countries,
including Saudi Arabia, Iran, and
remote and non-governed regions of
Afghanistan and Pakistan. Through
its partners, al-Qaeda was able to plan
and execute a series of showcase
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terrorist attacks in regions around the
world while focusing on “soft
targets.” Al-Qaeda continues to run an
intensive campaign of propaganda
and psychological warfare using
manifests and video and audio
cassettes, broadcast primarily by the
Qatari television station al-Jazeera,
and using the internet websites of
Islamic groups identifying with the
global jihad to disseminate Bin
Laden’s ideas. Finally, the organi-
zation has continued recruiting new
cadres by capitalizing both on its own
operative successes and on violent
conflicts involving Muslims (in Iraq,
Chechnya, the Israeli-Palestinian
arena, and Kashmir), a stance that
strengthened its claim that theirs is a
war of defense of Islam.
The United States
Scorecard
American public opinion estimates
the successes and failures in the battle
against al-Qaeda primarily through
the number of tangible achievements
that are of high symbolic value, and
according to the media coverage of
showcase terrorist attacks around the
world attributed to the large,
threatening, and seemingly homo-
genous entity known as al-Qaeda. In
this context, the most prominent fact
is that the United States and its allies
have failed to capture the al-Qaeda
leadership, notably Bin Laden and
Zawahiri, within what seems to an
impatient Western public as a
reasonable period of time. The fact
that the world’s number one fugitive,
the target of an international manhunt
unprecedented in scale, still manages
to defy the world’s sophisticated
intelligence agencies is perceived as a
sign of the weakness of the West. The
coalition’s failure to apprehend Bin
Laden also continues to strengthen
Bin Laden’s demonic image.
Bin Laden himself encourages this
dynamic as he conducts, virtually
unhindered, a sophisticated war of
propaganda against the United States
and its allies. He continues to employ
various media to call publicly on his
supporters to kill “the enemy of
Islam,” as he terms his adversaries,
whose ranks increase in an ever-
expanding circle. The success of his
supporters in carrying out a long
series of mass-casualty suicide attacks
has also been seen as a sign of the
weakness of the West in general, and
the United States in particular, and
has called into doubt their ability to
deal effectively with Islamic
fundamentalist terrorism.
Under its “achievements” column,
the United States can note that no
additional terrorist attacks have been
carried out within US borders thus far,
despite the fact that people are aware
of the possible temporary nature of
this success. Moreover, the arrest of
prominent terrorists from the senior
operational level of al-Qaeda has
received a high profile in the media
and has encouraged a feeling of great
satisfaction, primarily because those
arrested were directly involved in
especially painful attacks on
American targets.
American government and
intelligence officials are satisfied with
the handling of the campaign against
al-Qaeda and its affiliates, as well as
with the close cooperation with allied
security services throughout the
world which has resulted in the
thwarting of attacks and the arrest of
many operatives. However, beyond
the understandable sense of
achievement generated by particular
intelligence feats, attitudes towards
the successes and failures in the battle
have been sober and low-key, due to
the awareness of the campaign’s
length and complexity, and the fact
that there is no other choice but to
continue conducting this war until al-
Qaeda and its affiliates are defeated.
The battle is perceived as a serious
and acute challenge to the national
security of the United States and the
strategic interests of America as a
global superpower. The confrontation
with al-Qaeda and its affiliates is
understood as part of the overall
efforts by the United States and its
allies to deal with international
terrorism, including the necessary
confrontation with “failed states,”
states that support terrorism, and
additional terrorist organizations
outside the circle of “Afghan alumni.”
Al-Qaeda
ideology understands
its struggle as a long-
term effort that
transcends ready
spatial and temporal
contours.26
Imperatives of the
Ongoing Battle against
al-Qaeda
The West responded to al-Qaeda’s
harsh challenge, which reached new
heights in the September 11 attack and
has continued in the two years since,
with a major military offensive in
Afghanistan, the main country that
sheltered al-Qaeda. This offensive
toppled the Taliban’s terrorism-
supporting regime and came as a
harsh blow to al-Qaeda’s personnel
and infrastructure in the country.
However, it is clear that the terrorism
industry that Bin Laden established
and deployed in various locations
around the world over the years still
provides him with alternative modes
of operation. Al-Qaeda and affiliated
terrorist networks constitute Bin
Laden’s long arm with which he is
able to strike at his adversaries and
continue his efforts to achieve his
goals.
The words of Bin Laden and his
associates in the media reveal no
evidence of weakening in his ranks
and no intention whatsoever of
shying away from the violent battle;
to the contrary. Moreover, despite
feeble criticism of al-Qaeda’s
indiscriminate violence voiced
periodically by religious scholars and
political leaders in Muslim echelons,
it appears that Bin Laden still enjoys
support throughout the world for his
extremist aims and methods,
including the backing of religious
leaders and the approval of Islamic
religious law. In fact, a Saudi cleric
recently issued a ruling allowing the
use of non-conventional weapons in
the war against infidels.7 Clearly, al-
Qaeda and those it supports are far
from being discouraged in terms of
morale and capability, despite the
blows they have sustained.
From Bin Laden’s perspective, an
overall assessment of the gains and
losses of the past two years would be
favorable and even optimistic.
Furthermore, the United States and its
allies have been forced to understand
(or at least they should understand)
that they must achieve a decisive
victory in this asymmetrical battle,
especially when considering the
totality of the approach undertaken
by al-Qaeda on its way to realizing its
objectives. Such victory would entail
arresting or killing the leaders and
operatives of al-Qaeda and its
affiliates, as well as deterring or
punishing those who shelter them. It
should be emphasized that killing or
arresting the leaders of the organi-
zation, first and foremost Bin Laden,
is a necessary prerequisite for victory,
but will not be decisive in and of itself.
One of the lessons learned from an
interim assessment of the period since
September 11, 2001 is that the United
States and its allies must immediately
intensify their level of operations
against al-Qaeda and its affiliates
around the world. In other words,
they should adopt now a policy that
would in any case be implemented in
the event of another mega-terrorist
attack in the United States or
elsewhere similar in scale to the attack
of September 11, 2001, to include the
following components:
B On the national level –
thwarting of attacks; arrest of
operatives; modification of the legal
systems of Western countries to meet
the Islamic fundamentalist challenge;
effective punishment; supervision of
those who recruit activists.
B On the international level –
close pursuit of terrorists; closer
intelligence cooperation than exists
today, including intelligence-sharing
that is more “intimate” than the level
that is currently standard among
intelligence agencies around the
world; comprehensive handling of the
issue of money used to fund opera-
tions; prohibition of propaganda,
incitement, and encouragement of
attacks in general and of suicide
attacks in particular; supervision of
membership recruiters; modification
of international legal systems in order
to better address the threat of
terrorism; a greater willingness to
extradite operatives or to prosecute
them in the countries where they are
staying.
B Taking measures for
countering the danger of non-
conventional terrorism by tightening
the restrictions on the sale of
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components that may be used to
produce such materials, and by
preventing the purchase of non-
conventional warfare materials.
Anyone involved with disseminating
non-conventional weapons or
providing them to terrorist
organizations or networks should be
severely punished. The spread of this
phenomenon must be stopped while
it is still in its initial stages.
B Pressuring states like Iran and
Syria that support terrorism, and
“failed states” such as Afghanistan,
Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Kenya,
Pakistan, Indonesia, Thailand, and
other states in Africa and Asia, which
provide assistance to terrorists either
knowingly, out of weakness, or out of
an inability to control areas under
their sovereignty (even though it is
often a case of lack of political desire
to meet the challenge rather than an
inability to do so). In the event that
some of the “failed states” are unable
to address the phenomenon on their
own, the required actions can be taken
with their agreement and cooperation,
possibly under the auspices of the
United Nations.
B Finally, addressing in a highly
focused, large-scale international
effort the basic factors that enable al-
Qaeda and its affiliates to recruit
young people into its ranks. This step
was succinctly expressed by the head
of the French Intelligence Service
(D.S.T.) in an interview with Le Figaro,
when he listed “ignorance, arrogance,
and poverty” as a tripolar axis of evil
lying at the root of terrorism.8
The serious, ongoing challenge
posed to the world by the “Afghan
alumni” demands a highly focused
response. Only a sustained effort of
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away from the violent
battle.
this nature can augur a victory against
the high levels of international
terrorism.
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